

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR/East Germany

SUBJECT Comments on Soviet and East German Foreign Policy

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
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1. Pending a new four-power conference, the Soviets are holding up countermeasures against ratification of the Paris agreements to rearm West Germany under NATO. The Soviets are also restraining the GDR's use of such countermeasures until the time when West Germany actually begins rearmament. This strategy is believed to have been adopted because of the influence of the former Soviet High Commissioner in East Germany, Vladimir S. Semenov, who allegedly has won an agreement to delay the use of countermeasures until the end of April 1955.¹ It is possible that the Soviets in the Kremlin are interested in influencing the form and extent of West Germany's military participation.
2. The Soviets are seeking to establish a neutral belt to the west of the Iron Curtain. They are concentrating on Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In the case of Sweden, the degree of success anticipated by the Soviets may be indicated by the fact that the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrey A. Gromyko, is reportedly satisfied with his recent visit to Sweden.² In regard to Yugoslavia, the Soviets are reported to be of the opinion that "it seems sure that Yugoslavia can no longer be counted among the vassals of American politics".
3. The Soviets still maintain that a settlement of the German problem is a prerequisite to a treaty ending the occupation of Austria.
4. Despite restraint from the Kremlin, the GDR is expected to increase its infiltration attempts against the German Federal Republic. The GDR's apparent purpose is to strengthen the views of the opposition parties in Bonn that the key to a German settlement lies within Germany.

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Comments.

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1. This is given as received. [] does not state whether Semenov himself was responsible for the Soviet policy of restraint, or whether he was merely the channel through which the Soviets obtained a commitment from the GDR to conform to this policy.

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